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iNtRoductioN to tHe pRoblem – goveRNmeNts tHRougHout tHe WoRld aRe seek-
iNg to geNeRate moRe of tHeiR domestic poWeR fRom ReNeWable eNeRgy souRces. 
Power generation from wind energy is one of the most mature and impor-
tant renewable energy technologies. On average, projects are steadily 
growing in size; the trend is towards large-scale wind power plants. 
Such wind power megaprojects, however, are often marked by high 
complexity, poor design, and poor delivery, which can diminish their 
attractiveness to investors.
Purpose – This paper aims to shed light on investors’ willingness to 
finance wind power megaprojects and illuminate the ways in which not 
only risk and return factors of wind power megaprojects, but also behav-
ioral and social factors influence this attitude, which we call investor 
acceptance. In addition, this paper examines ways in which megapro-
ject managers can enhance and manage their project’s attractiveness 
to investors. 
Design/methodology/approach – This paper develops a conceptual 
model of investor acceptance of wind power megaprojects and its man-
agement based on insights from literature on behavioral finance, social 
acceptance of wind power projects, megaproject management and stake-
holder management. 
Findings – The paper concludes that investor acceptance of wind power 
megaprojects is theoretically prone to behavioral and social effects and 
that megaproject managers can influence investor acceptance through 
two different approaches: (1) indirectly (with respect to tactical project 
management) and (2) directly (related to stakeholder management). 
Research implications – This paper broadens the scope of the research 
on investor acceptance by applying and further developing this concept 
in the context of megaprojects in the wind power industry and by discuss-
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INTRODUCTION
Governments throughout the world are 
seeking to generate more of their do-
mestic power from renewable energy 
sources with the common goal of de-
creasing both carbon emissions and 
the dependence on limited fossil fuels. 
Power generation from wind energy is 
one of the most mature and fastest-
growing renewable energy technolo-
gies. Over the last 17 years, annual in-
stallations of wind power in Europe have 
continuously grown at an average rate 
of 15.6 % per year (EWEA, 2012a). Cur-
rently, 94 GW wind power capacity is 
installed in the European Union (GWEC, 
2012). Most of the wind power installa-
tions in the European Union today range 
from small to mid-scale in size (the av-
erage onshore wind park size is about 
10 MW[1]), but the size of projects is 
steadily increasing and the trend is for 
large-scale wind parks (EWEA, 2012a; 
IEA Wind, 2010). Particularly in the off-
shore wind power sector a number of 
very large-scale projects, so called 
“megaprojects” (Flyvbjerg et al., 2003), 
are under construction so far, such as 
the British offshore wind park Greater 
Gabbard (500 MW) or the German off-
shore wind park Borkum West II (400 
MW)[2] but this trend can also be wit-
nessed onshore: the largest wind park 
in continental Europe is currently be-
ing built at Fântânele and Cogealac, Ro-
mania, with a capacity of 600 MW. The 
Romanian Black Sea coast (Constanţa 
county) offers very good wind condi-
tions and will host several large-scale 
onshore wind parks in the 400-600 MW-
class that are currently under construc-
tion or approved. 
Megaprojects, in general, have sev-
eral advantages such as synergies in 
construction and maintenance and 
better financing and purchasing condi-
tions. But they are also characterized 
as “complex, politically-sensitive and 
involving a large number of partners” 
(van Marrewijk et al., 2008: 591) and 
often suffer from negative project per-
formance, i.e. they overrun budgets and 
fall behind schedule (e.g. the case of 
the London Array offshore wind park, 
see further below). These issues have 
important implications for construction 
companies as well as for other stake-
holders such as project initiators, de-
velopers and investors. Negative proj-
ect performance can, for instance, be 
attributed to the underestimation of 
costs (Flyvbjerg et al., 2003) or the es-
tablishment of “misaligned or under-
developed governance arrangements” 
(Sanderson, 2012). Research shows 
that cost estimation and forecasting is 
more prone to psychological biases (e.g. 
optimism) and politics (e.g. strategic 
misrepresentation) besides technical 
issues related to data and forecasting 
models (Flyvbjerg, 2006). Further, stud-
ies suggest that diverse and competing 
project cultures and rationalities (van 
Marrewijk et al., 2008) and the unex-
pected increase of costs during con-
struction (Merrow, 2003) paired with 
lack of ex post governing mechanisms to 
deal with extraordinary and unexpected 
events (Sanderson, 2012) contribute to 
poor megaproject delivery. A common 
issue with megaprojects that often ham-
pers their effective design and delivery 
and thus positive project performance 
is that they operate in an environment 
of uncertainty (project outcomes and 
probabilities of entry unknown) rather 
than risk (project outcomes and prob-
abilities of entry known) (Sanderson, 
2012). Research particularly shows a 
positive relation between the level of 
technical, social, organizational and en-
vironmental complexity and uncertainty 
(Antoniadis et al., 2011; Bosch-Rekveldt 
et al., 2011; Giezen, 2012). 
This brings up the question of how 
megaproject stakeholders – both in 
general terms and with regard to wind 
power megaprojects in particular – deal 
with this uncertainty when making their 
decisions. In this paper, we focus par-
ticularly on investors, whose impor-
tance as key stakeholders who provide 
financial backing without which projects 
could not exist. In addition, both empiri-
cal evidence and the literature show that 
“investor acceptance” plays a decisive 
role in determining the success or fail-
ure of wind power projects (IEA Wind, 
2010) and renewable energy innova-
tions in general (e.g. Wüstenhagen et 
al., 2007). In the offshore wind power in-
dustry, for instance, non-recourse debt 
financing grew by 40% in 2011 and inter-
est in offshore wind park investments 
has increased among equity investors 
(EWEA, 2012b). But the relatively young 
age of this industry still creates high 
risk for investors (specifically, with re-
gard to technology and regulation, e.g. 
related to grid connection) and makes 
it more difficult for offshore develop-
ers to obtain funding for their projects 
(Prässler and Schaechtele, 2012). In-
creasing investor acceptance of offshore 
wind power projects is essential in the 
context of the European clean energy 
strategy. It would take more than a ten-
fold increase in capacity from 3.8 GW in-
stalled by the end of 2011 (EWEA, 2012b) 
to o achieve the target of 43 GW offshore 
wind power by 2020 set by the members 
of the European Union in course of their 
National Renewable Energy Action Plans 
(NREAP) (European Commission, 2010).
From a theoretical perspective, in-
vestor acceptance can be defined as the 
decision of financiers to invest in inno-
vative technologies or projects. In the 
context of wind power, this concept is 
treated as part of a more comprehensive 
model of social acceptance as defined 
by Wüstenhagen et al. in 2007. The so-
cial acceptance model distinguishes be-
tween three distinct, yet interdependent 
dimensions: socio-political acceptance 
of a new technology (e.g. of the general 
public or policymakers), community ac-
ceptance (e.g. of the community and 
neighborhoods that are adjacent to in-
frastructure projects) and market accep-
tance (e.g. of consumers or investors). 
As this paper takes an investor accep-
tance perspective, it interprets the other 
two dimensions of social acceptance as 
policy risk (socio-political acceptance) 
and community acceptance risk, which 
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both relate to the macro environment 
of a wind power (megaproject) invest-
ment. Such macro risk factors, along 
with other types of risks, which relate 
to a more technical micro context of a 
wind power project (e.g. technology 
risk, completion risk, and market risk), 
affect investors’ risk-return assessment 
during the decision-making process.
In an investment context, risk is tra-
ditionally treated as “objective” (Gan-
zach, 2000) whereas empirical research 
shows that a more comprehensive the-
ory of financial risk such as perceived 
risk, which also considers psychologi-
cal mechanisms better explains inves-
tor behavior (e.g. Ganzach, 2000; Ol-
sen, 2008; Slovic, 1992; Slovic et al., 
2004). Particularly scholars in the field 
of behavioral finance (e.g. Barberis and 
Thaler, 2003; Kahneman, 2003; Kahn-
eman and Tversky, 1979; Shiller, 2003; 
Simon, 1955) provide evidence that psy-
chological factors such as status quo 
bias, frame dependence, loss aversion 
or overconfidence affect investor be-
havior. They also show that their in-
fluence is specifically prevalent in the 
context of investment decision-making 
under uncertainty. Two examples from 
the offshore wind power industry illus-
trate the way in which behavioral and 
social factors might influence invest-
ment decision-making: first, that of the 
London Array offshore wind park, which 
had to deal with serious increases in 
cost due to the rising prices of steel and 
wind turbines before production began, 
which contributed to Shell’s exit from 
the project in 2008.[3] Such rotation 
of key project stakeholders can have 
negative impact on project performance 
(Giezen, 2012) but can also alert other 
investors in the industry to reconsider 
their investment plans based on this 
information. The second example is the 
Hypo-Vereinsbank (HVB), one of the pi-
oneers in project financing. The bank 
announced that it was setting aside re-
serves of 710 million euros due to con-
siderable delay in one of its offshore 
wind parks – thus effectively issuing a 
warning to other banks that might be 
entering or planning to enter the off-
shore wind power industry.[4]
The example of the London Array off-
shore wind park also illustrates that 
investor acceptance is not static; in 
other words, even though an investor 
decides to finance a megaproject, in-
vestor acceptance can decrease over 
time due to different reasons and lead 
to a withdrawal of capital, and thus po-
tentially induce project instability or 
failure. Deepening our theoretical un-
derstanding of the determining factors 
in the investment decision-making pro-
cess under uncertainty and the man-
agement of issues related to investor 
acceptance in the context of very large-
scale wind power projects thus forms 
a fruitful gateway to further research. 
More specifically, this paper seeks to 
respond to the following two questions: 
 X How do behavioral and social effects 
besides macro and micro risk factors 
in wind power megaproject invest-
ments influence investors’ risk-return 
assessment, risk and return percep-
tions, and thus investor acceptance 
of wind power megaprojects?
 X How can wind power megaproject 
managers positively influence inves-
tor acceptance i.e. through which 
mechanisms and elements?
This paper puts forward a conceptual 
model of investor acceptance of wind 
power megaprojects, drawing on insight 
gleaned from literature on behavioral fi-
nance, social acceptance of wind power 
projects, megaproject management, 
and stakeholder management. It aims 
at establishing a theoretical founda-
tion to increase our understanding of 
investor acceptance and its implica-
tions on megaproject management in 
a wind power context – an approach 
that could conceivably be further devel-
oped as well as empirically verified and 
validated in future research. Moreover, 
the findings elaborated here provide 
insight that should prove beneficial not 
only to those who manage and/or invest 
in wind power megaprojects, but also 
to policymakers, consultants, and other 
stakeholders.
The paper proceeds as follows: first, 
the authors explore the concept of in-
vestor acceptance in greater depth and 
further put it in the context of invest-
ment decision-making under uncer-
tainty. Next, they introduce a concep-
tual model of investor acceptance in 
wind power megaprojects based on in-
sights from the literature review. Lastly, 
the authors discuss implications of in-
vestor acceptance on the management 
of wind power megaprojects and ap-
proaches to influencing and managing 
investor acceptance.
Theory 
Investor Acceptance of Renewable 
Energy Technology
This paper specifically focuses on inves-
tors in wind power megaprojects as in-
ternal stakeholders who possess the ca-
pabilities and resources to highly influ-
ence the performance of a project (Atkin 
and Skitmore, 2008; Cleland, 1995; Lim 
et al., 2005; Mitchell et al., 1997). Mega-
project investors, in this context, are 
defined as all equity shareholders of a 
wind power megaproject or project com-
pany (special purpose vehicle, SPV), i.e. 
for instance project sponsors, finan-
cial or institutional (e.g. infrastructure 
funds, private equity funds, pension 
funds) and strategic (e.g. power compa-
nies) investors and other stakeholders 
that hold an equity stake in a project 
or SPV such as project developers or 
technology producers (Sonntag-O’Brian 
and Usher, 2004; UNEP, 2012). We ad-
ditionally include banks and other debt 
capital providers (e.g. mezzanine capi-
tal) into the definition of megaproject 
investors used in this paper as banks, 
in particular, typically provide large 
parts of project finance and are also 
subject to acceptance issues (“bank-
ability of projects”) (Lüdeke-Freund and 
Loock, 2011). The actual group of inves-
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tors differs between projects (see e.g. 
EWEA, 2012b). The actual megaproject 
managers also vary between projects 
and can be project sponsors, project 
developers, consultants, or other ser-
vice providers. 
In general terms, investor accep-
tance can be defined as financiers’ de-
cisions to invest in innovative technolo-
gies or projects. This concept is related 
to the diffusion of innovations (Rogers, 
2003), i.e. the adoption of innovative 
goods or services in consumer markets. 
If investors accept an investment op-
portunity or adopt a financial product, 
it means that they are willing to finan-
cially engage in a tangible asset (e.g. 
power generation project) or intangible 
asset (e.g. bond, stock, etc.) in return 
for economic gain. Investor acceptance 
also indicates an investor’s decision as 
to whether or not to exit or disinvest 
over time.
In the context of wind power, investor 
acceptance was first introduced as part 
of a more comprehensive framework of 
social acceptance (Wüstenhagen et al., 
2007). In a narrower sense, social accep-
tance of wind power or renewable energy 
technology in general can be defined as 
the public support of such technology 
and routes back to the 1980s (Bosley 
and Bosley, 1988; Carlman, 1982, 1984; 
McDaniel, 1983; Thayer, 1988; Wolsink, 
1987, 1988, 1989). Since then a large 
number of scholars have further devel-
oped and investigated this concept and 
its implications in more detail with re-
spect to the impact of landscape issues 
(e.g. Pasqualetti, 2011a, b, c; Wolsink, 
2007a), the influence of social accep-
tance on renewable energy diffusion 
(e.g. Toke et al., 2008; Raven et al., 2008) 
benefit and risk sharing (e.g. Wolsink, 
2007a, b), and with respect to specific 
subtypes of renewable energy technol-
ogy such as offshore wind power (e.g. 
Firestone and Kempton, 2007; Firestone 
et al., 2009; Haggett, 2008). 
While studies on the subject of social 
acceptance specifically build on public, 
political, and regulatory issues (Carlman, 
1984), the conceptual model introduced 
by Wüstenhagen et al. (2007) takes a 
more holistic approach and integrates 
three dimensions: (1) socio-political ac-
ceptance; (2) community acceptance; 
and (3) market acceptance (see also Fig-
ure 1). In contrast to previous models, 
this one specifically references market 
acceptance in addition to public and po-
litical elements.
Wüstenhagen et al. (2007) also em-
phasize the interdependence of these 
dimensions of social acceptance. Specifi-
cally important in this context, is the in-
fluence of socio-political and community 
acceptance on investor acceptance. On 
the one hand, an investor’s risk and re-
turn assessment is highly influenced by 
the prevailing renewable energy support 
scheme, the amount of financial support 
or the stability of the political framework 
(Breukers and Wolsink, 2007). On the 
other hand, investors are sensitive to 
community acceptance issues since lo-
cal resistance has a negative impact on 
the business case, i.e. it increases costs 
and extends the project development pe-
riod (IEA Wind, 2010; Mormann, 2012). 
Both of these two risk factors, policy risk 
and community acceptance risk, comple-
mented by legal and regulatory risk, can 
be treated as macro risk factors from a 
project investor’s perspective. Further, 
investors differentiate a number of micro 
risk factors (e.g. structural risk, technol-
ogy risk, completion risk) that are di-
rectly related to the specific wind power 
project. In general, wind power mega-
project investments share the same risk 
factors as investments in smaller-scale 
wind power projects, other renewable 
energy technology, and general infra-
structure (mega)projects. Table 1 sum-
marizes the risk factors that are involved 
in wind power investments. 
Previous research related to inves-
tor acceptance of wind power is scarce 
(Wüstenhagen et al., 2007). Past stud-
ies only focused on the buy side (inves-
tor’s perspective) rather than both, the 
buy and the sell (in this case, the project 
manager’s perspective) side. Further, 
scholars specifically investigated the 
influence of renewable energy policy 
frameworks (policy risk) and community 
acceptance (community acceptance risk) 
on investors’ or project developers’ will-
ingness to invest in wind power projects.
Figure 1 The triangle of social acceptance of renewable energy innovation 
(Wüstenhagen et al., 2007).
Socio-political acceptance
 X Of technologies and policies
 X By the public
 X By key stakeholders
 X By policymakers
Community acceptance
 X Procedural justice







Bürer (2009), for instance, conducted 
qualitative interviews with investors and 
project developers in Switzerland in or-
der to increase the understanding of in-
vestor acceptance of wind power proj-
ects. Key findings of this study show that 
investor acceptance generally follows 
local and social acceptance due to the 
various possibilities for locals, environ-
mental groups, and the national land-
scape protection organization to oppose 
wind power projects. Further, high regu-
latory and administrative burdens in the 
permitting process, high development 
costs related to cabling, transportation 
Risk factors Description Market
Macro risk factors
Legal and regulatory risk Legal and regulatory risk is attributed to host government 
regulations, including currency risk, high taxes and 
royalties, demands for equity participation, expropriation 
and nationalization or political violence such as war, 
sabotage, or terrorism.
Farrell (2003);  
Yescombe (2002)
Policy risk Policy risk arises from a possible negative change in 
national laws and provisions, i.e. if the national wind power 
support scheme is changed with negative impacts on wind 
power projects (e.g. reduction in feed-in tariff, requirements 
that a specific percentage of the components needs to 
be locally produced, abolishment of priority dispatch for 
electricity from renewable energy sources). 
Lüthi and Wüstenhagen (2012);
Wüstenhagen and Menichetti 
(2012)
Community acceptance risk Community needs to be locally produced, abolishment 
negative attitude towards the actual installation of wind 
turbines and parks as local project development phase.
IEA Wind (2010); 
Wüstenhagen et al. (2007)
Micro risk factors
Structural risk Structural risk e.g. relates to the structure of the ownership 
of the project company (special purpose vehicle, SPV), 
quality of the sponsor and contractual risk sharing between 
parties.
SAM (2012)
Technology risk Technology risk stems from the innovativeness or ongoing 




Completion risk Completion risk can be defined as the likelihood and the 
extent to which a project may incur construction delays or 
cost overruns.
Fitch Ratings (2011)
Operation risk Operation risk mainly relates to a reduction in productivity 
(due to outages and or failure to meet expected 
performance standards) or may incur costs that are greater 
than projected.
Fitch Ratings (2011)
Supply risk Supply risk is particularly attributed to the risk that the 




Market and revenue risk Market risk mainly relates to revenue (return) components 
and stems from the possibility that the project may lose 
its competitive position in the output market, e.g. if the 
national wind power support scheme is changed in a 
negative manner (e.g. if the feed-in tariff is reduced).
Farrell (2003); 
Fitch Ratings (2011)
Table 1 Overview of risk factors involved in wind power investments
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of wind turbines (due to challenging to-
pography) and decreased feed-in tariffs 
limit the attractiveness of the return on 
investment (ROI) for investors in wind 
power projects in Switzerland. Thus, 
this study highlights the importance 
of both, socio-political and community 
acceptance for investor acceptance of 
wind power projects. Studies on the in-
tersection of renewable energy policy 
and investor acceptance also emphasize 
the importance of policy risk such as 
policy stability for international inves-
tors in wind power and other renewable 
energy projects in emerging economies 
(IWÖ-HSG, 2010), Europe (e.g. Breukers 
and Wolsink, 2007) and the U.S. (Bar-
radale, 2010; Mormann, 2012). Lüthi 
and Prässler (2011) report from a survey 
among American and European project 
developers that aside from the level of 
total remuneration, non-economic bar-
riers such as legal security and the ad-
ministrative process duration greatly 
impact project developers’ decisions 
regarding location.
Investment Decision-Making Under 
Conditions of Uncertainty
As already shown in the previous sub-
chapter, investors in wind power mega-
projects, but also in general, typically 
decide on their financial engagements 
through a process of carefully weight-
ing risks and returns. Frameworks and 
mathematical models have been devel-
oped to support investors in their deci-
sion-making processes. However, there 
are two important issues that limit the 
application of traditional investment 
decision models in a context of mega-
projects in general and specifically with 
respect to wind power megaprojects: (1) 
they assume that decisions are made 
in a context of risk rather than uncer-
tainty; and (2) further consider financial 
risk as a purely statistical and objective 
concept without incorporating psycho-
logical factors. 
Traditional investment decision 
frameworks and models mostly as-
sume conditions of risk, i.e. decision-
makers are able to assign mathemati-
cally or statistically derived objective 
probabilities to a range of known fu-
ture events or outcomes (Knight, 1921). 
However, in the case of megaprojects, 
due to their high degree of complex-
ity (Giezen, 2012), investors are often 
faced with conditions of uncertainty. 
Literature distinguishes two types of 
uncertainty: In the first type, decision-
makers know the alternative future 
events or outcomes but are only able to 
assign subjective probabilities to them 
based on “expectations grounded in 
historical practice” (Sanderson, 2012: 
435). In the second type, the “nature 
and range of future events or outcomes 
is unknown and unknowable, not sim-
ply hard to predict because of a lack of 
relevant data” and thus decision-mak-
ers are faced with a situation where the 
future is socially constructed over time 
with “little or no relation to the past or 
the present” (ibid.). The underlying as-
sumption of this research paper is that 
megaproject investors normally treat 
and manage uncertainties as risks and 
assign probabilities to a range of future 
events or outcomes even though this 
practice might be questionable (Kop-
penjan et al., 2010; Perminova et al., 
2008). Treating uncertainties as risks 
or simply ignoring them is even more 
problematic when investing in mega-
projects in the offshore wind power in-
dustry. The reasons are an increased 
technological complexity and lacking 
past experience and historical data, 
which might even be exaggerated under 
specific geographical conditions, such 
as in the German offshore wind power 
industry. The German Federal Ministry 
for the Environment, for instance, em-
phasizes in this context that “the off-
shore wind energy usage in Germany 
with its prevailing requirements related 
to water depth and distance to coast is 
a completely new way of wind energy 
usage” (BMU, 2007: 113). 
Thus, literature suggests, that the 
higher the degree of context-uncertainty 
the higher the degree of subjectivity in 
decision-making related to the particular 
context. A more comprehensive theory 
of financial risk that better explains this 
subjectivity in decision-making under 
uncertainty, is the concept of perceived 
risk, which views financial risk as “a 
multi attribute psychological phenom-
enon that involves other attributes be-
sides probabilities and outcomes” (Ol-
sen, 2008: 58). Such other attributes 
include, for instance, feelings, which are 
based on emotion and affect (Slovic et 
al., 2004). This theory of risk specifically 
builds on the perspective that risk is “in-
herently subjective” and that it “does 
not exist out there, independent of our 
minds and cultures, waiting to be mea-
sured” (Slovic, 1992: 119). 
However, independent of adopting 
this view of “pure subjectivity” schol-
ars in this field agree that what actually 
influences human decisions are percep-
tions of risk and return rather than purely 
statistical risk and return values (Olsen, 
2008). Ganzach (2000), for instance, fur-
ther examined such risk and return judg-
ments in a financial context and distin-
guished two different models depending 
on whether the investor is familiar with 
the financial asset or not. He showed that 
in case familiarity with financial assets is 
given, risk and return judgments are gen-
erated based on “appropriate ecological 
information” about risk and return values 
available through e.g. past experience or 
summary statistics from financial reports 
(ibid: 356). In case of unfamiliar assets, 
both risk and return judgments are de-
rived from global preferences toward the 
assets. Further, the results of Ganzach’s 
experiments suggest that although the 
ecological values of risk and return are 
positively related, perceptions of risk and 
return are not. The inverse relationship 
between perceived risk and return, which 
can be attributed to affect, has also been 
reported by other authors such as Al-
hakami and Slovic (1994), Finucane et al. 
(2000), and Finucane and Holup (2006). 
Different studies from the behav-
ioral finance literature further show in 
this context that investors tend to buy 
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assets they are familiar with such as 
domestic stocks, as they (wrongly) per-
ceive these assets to bear less financial 
risk (Coval and Moskowitz, 1999; French 
and Poterba, 1991; Grinblatt and Kelo-
harju, 2001; Huberman, 2001; Wang et 
al., 2011). Several behavioral finance 
scholars provide empirical evidence of 
other systematic biases[5] that influ-
ence investment decisions under uncer-
tainty as well as risk and return percep-
tions (e.g. Barberis and Thaler, 2003; 
Kahneman, 2003; Kahneman and Tver-
sky, 1979; Shiller, 2003; Simon, 1955) 
such as status quo bias, frame depen-
dence, loss aversion or overconfidence. 
Besides such cognitive or behavioral 
biases literature also shows the influ-
ence of social effects on investment de-
cision-making and risk perception (e.g. 
Wang and Johnston, 1995; Wang et al., 
2001). A social phenomenon in financial 
markets is, for instance, herding, which 
refers to the behavior that investors are 
influenced by other investors’ decisions. 
If their investment decision is differ-
ent than the decision of other investors 
they alter their initial decision to follow 
the “crowd” (Bikhchandani et al., 1992; 
Bikhchandani and Sharma, 2001; Froot 
et al., 1992; Hirshleifer and Teoh, 2003). 
Related mechanisms are also discussed 
in the science and technology as well as 
diffusion of innovations literature, such 
as expectation dynamics (e.g. Wüsten-
hagen et al., 2009) and peer effects 
(Rogers, 2003). Scholars define expec-
tation dynamics as specific (related to 
a product or project) or general (related 
to the role of a particular technology 
in society) expectations about the fu-
ture (Ruef and Markard, 2010), which 
might add momentum or create a hype 
cycle in an innovation diffusion process 
accelerating adoption and technologi-
cal development (Borup et al., 2006). 
Peer effects in the diffusion of innova-
tions literature refer to that members 
of a social system adopt an innovation 
over time by means of communication 
through e.g. mass media and, specifi-
cally, the interaction between individu-
als (Rogers, 2003).
The influence of behavioral and so-
cial effects on investment decisions un-
der uncertainty related to renewable 
energy technology has also been shown 
by various studies: Hampl et al. (2012), 
for instance, reveal that venture capi-
talists’ investments in renewable en-
ergy start-ups are strongly influenced 
by social networks; Chassot et al. (2012) 
provide empirical evidence suggesting 
that venture capitalists’ underinvest-
ment in renewable energy deals can 
be explained by a policy aversion bias; 
Lüdeke-Freund and Loock (2011) show 
that banks’ financing decisions with re-
gard to large-scale photovoltaic proj-
ects are prone to a “debt for brands” 
bias related to the photovoltaic mod-
ules that are implemented in the project. 
Conceptual model of investor 
acceptance in wind power 
megaprojects
Based on insights from our literature 
review in the previous chapters of this 
paper, we introduce a conceptual model 
of investor acceptance in wind power 
megaprojects in Figure 2. This model 
builds on previous work and extends it 
in two ways: (1) by explicitly distinguish-
Figure 2 Conceptual model of investor acceptance of wind power megaprojects (relations between (percieved) risk and 
return attributes based on Ganzach, 2000; overall model adapted from Wüstenhagen and Menichetti, 2012)
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ing between the influence of behavioral 
(e.g. status quo bias, overconfidence) 
and social effects (e.g. peer effects) 
besides macro and micro risk factors 
(e.g. policy risk, community acceptance 
risk, technology risk) on investment de-
cisions in wind power megaprojects; 
and (2) by illustrating how megapro-
ject managers can positively influence 
investor acceptance, which will be the 
explicit subject of the following chapter 
of this paper.
The conceptual model as depicted in 
Figure 2 shows that information about 
actual macro and micro risk factors of 
the underlying wind power megaproject 
have a positive relationship to return 
factors of such projects, i.e. if risks in-
crease, investors demand a risk com-
pensation and thus higher returns on 
their investment. This information about 
actual risk and return values further 
influence investor-specific perceptions 
about risks and returns related to the 
project investment (Ganzach, 2000). In 
course of this cognitive process of risk-
return assessment several behavioral 
(e.g. status quo bias, overconfidence) 
or social (e.g. peer effects) biases or 
effects might occur, which directly in-
fluence risk and return perceptions (e.g. 
Kahneman, 2003; Olsen, 2008). Specifi-
cally social effects are relevant in the 
context of wind power megaprojects. 
The decisions of investors, but also the 
decisions of other industry players such 
as EPCs (engineering, procurement and 
construction contractors) or technol-
ogy producers, can have a much wider 
impact that even goes beyond the af-
fected project by acting as references 
and thus by influencing future investor 
acceptance of large-scale and complex 
wind power projects. This is what we, 
for instance, refer to as “peer effects” in 
this specific context. The risk and return 
judgments finally affect an investor’s 
decision whether to invest in a wind 
power megaproject or not. This whole 
process of risk-return evaluation and 
decision-making is regularly updated 
over time during project implementa-
tion, i.e. although if investor acceptance 
is achieved at a certain stage of the proj-
ect, this is no guaranty that it will remain 
stable over time (see, for instance, the 
London Array case where Shell exited 
during project implementation). 
The conceptual model in Figure 2 fur-
ther shows which elements of the invest-
ment decision-making process mega-
project managers can influence in order 
to increase investor acceptance. More 
detailed explanations related to these 
mechanisms and managerial implica-
tions are subject of the following chapter. 
Managerial Implications
Management of Projects and 
Stakeholders
The Project Management Institute (PMI)
[6] defines a project as “a temporary 
group activity designed to produce a 
unique product, service or result” and 
thus project management as “the ap-
plication of knowledge, skills and tech-
niques to execute projects effectively 
and efficiently”. Project management 
and project management training in a 
narrower sense is more tactical and ex-
ecution focused dedicated to optimizing 
time and cost factors (Eweje, Turner, and 
Müller, 2012). But due to their scale, du-
ration, and far-reaching impact, mega-
projects additionally require a more 
strategic management and decision-
making approach. An important element 
of strategic project management is the 
management of stakeholder interests. 
Stakeholder management in a mega-
project context, thus, puts high empha-
sis on the identification, analysis, and 
management of key stakeholders and 
the establishment of effective gover-
nance structures (Dunoviţ, 2010; Eweje 
et al., 2012). 
Stakeholder management is a tradi-
tional strategic management instrument 
routed in stakeholder theory in the con-
text of organizations (Freeman, 1984). 
Transferred from a corporate level to the 
management of construction projects, 
Newcombe (2003: 842) defines stake-
holders as any “groups or individuals 
who have a stake in, or expectation 
of, the project’s performance”, which 
includes “clients, project managers, 
designers, subcontractors, suppliers, 
funding bodies, users and the commu-
nity at large”. Literature provides dif-
ferent classifications of stakeholders 
such as according to their involvement 
in a project (internal versus external 
stakeholders) (e.g. Freeman, 1984; Gib-
son, 2000), their power and legitimacy 
(Johnson et al., 2005; Mitchell et al., 
1997; Newcombe, 2003) or their posi-
tion towards a project (e.g. McElroy and 
Mills, 2007). Meeting the expectations 
of stakeholders over the life cycle of a 
construction project is mandatory for 
a successful project delivery as stake-
holders can have the power to delay or 
even stop projects (Atkin and Skitmore, 
2008; Cleland, 1995; Lim et al., 2005; 
Mitchell et al., 1997). 
Figure 3 gives an overview of typical 
stakeholders involved in wind power 
(mega)projects. In megaprojects often 
more than one firm or individual can be 
attributed to a stakeholder type. Some-
times one firm or individual takes over 
multiple stakeholder roles.
Approaches to Influencing and 
Managing Investor Acceptance
From a megaproject manager’s perspec-
tive investor acceptance can be influ-
enced over two different routes[7]: (1) in-
directly through tactical project manage-
ment focusing on project performance 
in terms of time and costs (as project 
performance has a high impact on inves-
tor acceptance); and (2) directly through 
the active management of investor ac-
ceptance as part of stakeholder manage-
ment and governance. Both approaches 
are essential in order to achieve high 
investor acceptance as they target two 
different elements of the investor accep-
tance model (see Figure 2) as elaborated 
in the following paragraphs.
Tactical project management particu-
larly influences the macro and micro risk 
factors (excluding risks that can only 
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be influenced by other stakeholders 
and force majeure risks). Some of these 
risks are also influenced by strategic 
project management techniques such 
as external stakeholder management 
(community acceptance risk). In gen-
eral, risks are managed through an ad-
equate risk management process that 
typically comprises the steps of initia-
tion, identification, analysis, planning, 
monitoring, and control (risk retention, 
transfer, reduction and avoidance) (e.g. 
Chapman, 1997; Akintoye and MacLeod, 
1997; Perminova et al., 2008). In or-
der to manage community acceptance 
risks managers of wind power mega-
projects can adopt different benefit 
and risk sharing models, such as co-
ownership through community funds or 
power contracting, in order to increase 
the community acceptance of projects. 
A more comprehensive model of stake-
holder management with the objective 
to increase social acceptance of renew-
able energy technology projects is the 
ESTEEM methodology[8], which might 
also be applied to manage investor 
acceptance issues. How megaproject 
managers treat and manage such risks, 
and thus ensure positive project perfor-
mance, has high influence on an inves-
tor’s risk-return assessment and thus 
on investor acceptance. Therefore, this 
is what we summarize as the indirect 
influence on investor acceptance. 
The investor’s perceived risks (and 
returns) that are for instance influenced 
by behavioral and social factors such 
as actions by peers or other industry 
players, are harder to influence and 
manage. Typically, the investor accep-
tance risk (specifically related to exit 
or disinvestment over the lifecycle of 
a megaproject) is treated through con-
tractual arrangements. Besides ade-
quate contracts this active investor ac-
ceptance management also includes 
investor relationship management as 
part of stakeholder management activi-
ties and strategic megaproject manage-
ment (Eweje et al., 2012). Relationship 
management should specifically target 
the perceptions of risks and returns 
that investors hold with regards to a 
financial engagement in wind power 
megaprojects. This can comprise tech-
niques such as active communication, 
negotiation, or the offering of incen-
tives (Chinyio and Akintoye, 2008). 
The management of investor percep-
tions is important in both stages of an 
investment cycle: (1) the pre-contrac-
tual phase of opportunity identification 
and assessment; and (2) the post-con-
tractual phase of investment manage-
ment (e.g. decision to exit or disinvest). 
Negative (e.g. no investment interest at 
all) or decreased investor acceptance 
over the lifecycle of a project may have 
negative impact on project performance 
in terms of time and budget overruns. 
This active and ongoing management 
of investor acceptance relates to the 
common tenor of recent literature in 
the megaproject management field with 
regards to megaproject governance. 
Scholars emphasize the importance 
of “governing” practices in terms of 
a dynamic process versus a static es-
tablishment of processes and practices 
in course of the project planning stage 
(“governance”) (Sanderson, 2012). 
Figure 4 summarizes the two ap-
proaches how to influence and man-
age investor acceptance.
CONCLUSIONS 
The energy industry is undergoing a 
fundamental transformation, which has 
been coined a “global energy technol-
ogy revolution” by the International En-
ergy Agency (IEA, 2008). In search of 
Figure 3 Typical stakeholders of a wind power (mega)project 
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a sustainable energy supply, govern-
ments around the globe have set the 
goal to grow the supply of energy from 
renewable sources. As a consequence, 
there is a need to significantly scale up 
previous levels of investment in renew-
able energy. Specifically important in 
this context, is the financing of wind 
power as one of the most mature and 
fastest-growing renewable energy tech-
nologies. As the trend in this industry, 
in both sectors, onshore and offshore, 
is for very large-scale wind power proj-
ects the average project gets more com-
plex in technical, social, organizational 
and environmental terms and thus more 
uncertain. In the offshore wind power 
industry this uncertainty is even higher 
as this market sector is still in earlier 
stages of development than the estab-
lished onshore sector. The question 
arises how key stakeholders like inves-
tors deal with this increased uncertainty 
inherent to such wind power megaproj-
ects and how megaproject managers 
can positively influence and manage 
investor acceptance. 
In this contribution we introduce a 
conceptual model of investor accep-
tance of wind power megaprojects and 
approaches how to manage investor 
acceptance based on insights from the 
literature on behavioral finance, social 
acceptance of wind power projects, 
megaproject management and stake-
holder management. This conceptual 
model could be used as a starting point 
to further investigate the issue of inves-
tor acceptance in a wind power mega-
project context particularly in course of 
empirical studies such as case studies 
or surveys of investors and megaproject 
managers. Findings will generate valu-
able insights for managers and inves-
tors of wind power megaprojects but 
also for other stakeholders such as poli-
cymakers and consultants. Potentially 
it will also be possible to draw lessons 
for other energy sectors (e.g. gas-fired 
power stations or pipelines, electricity 
transmission grids) or even across in-
frastructure sectors (e.g. transporta-
tion) that specifically have to deal with 
investor acceptance issues. 
An interesting feature of the offshore 
wind power market is a shift in the type 
of investors. While these capital-inten-
sive projects have traditionally be fi-
nanced by strategic investors such as 
power companies that are used to build 
centralized and very large-scale power 
plants the investor base in such proj-
ects is getter more diverse (e.g. pen-
sion funds or other financial investors). 
With new types of investors with differ-
ing investment strategies, rationalities, 
and risk appetites entering the wind 
power scene analyzing investor accep-
tance and its management gets even 
more relevant. Further studies on this 
issue, both conceptual and empirical 
ones, might thus specifically focus on 
differences in risk-return assessment, 
risk perceptions and return expecta-
tions as well as management aspects 




[1] Own calculations based on http://www.
thewindpower.net/windfarms_list_en.php 
(accessed 27 November 2012).
[2] The EWEA (2012b) shows that the average 
size of offshore wind power projects being 












html (accessed 27 November 2012).
[5] The question remains whether this deviation 
from the efficient market hypothesis (Fama, 
1991) is a bias to fully rational behavior rather 
than a facet of rationality in order to deal with 





[7] We particularly focus on “risk” and “risk 
perceptions” in the following paragraphs, as 
we assume in our conceptual model a positive 
relationship between risk and return factors, 
between risk and perceived risk as well as 
between return and perceived return factors.
[8] For more information on this methodology, 
please refer to http://www.esteem-tool.eu 
(accessed 27 November 2012).
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